Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice
Volume 22

Issue 2

Article 5

6-2016

Not Just a Game: the Employment Status and Collective
Bargaining Rights of Professional ESports Players
Hunter Amadeus Bayliss
Washington and Lee University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the Labor
and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hunter Amadeus Bayliss, Not Just a Game: the Employment Status and Collective Bargaining Rights of
Professional ESports Players, 22 Wash. & Lee J. Civ. Rts. & Soc. Just. 359 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol22/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice at Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Not Just a Game: the Employment Status and
Collective Bargaining Rights of Professional
ESports Players
Hunter Amadeus Bayliss ∗
Table of Contents
I. Introduction .....................................................................360
II. Background ......................................................................362
A. It’s all Geek to Me: What is League of
Legends? ....................................................................362
B. Professional League of Legends: The Entities
Involved and the Agreements that Govern ...............363
III. Analysis: Are Professional League of Legends
Players Employees of Riot Games? .................................367
A. Laws that Govern ......................................................367
B. Applicable California Employment Law ...................368
1. Definitions of Employees .....................................368
2. Proving Employment ...........................................368
3. League of Legends Players, Teams,
and the California Employment Factors .............370
a. League of Legends Teams ..............................372
b. League of Legends Players .............................375
i. The Multipart Control Test ......................376
ii. The Secondary Indicia ..............................380
C. Applicable Federal Employment Laws .....................383
1. League of Legends Tournaments and
Interstate Commerce ...........................................383
2. The NLRA Definitions of an Employee ...............385
3. Are League of Legends Professional
Players Employees Under the NLRA? ................386
4. The FLSA Definitions of Employee .....................392

∗

J.D., May 2016.

359

360

22 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 359 (2016)

IV. Analysis: Employment Benefits and What
Rights Professional Players Currently Lack ...................394
A. What Employment Status Brings a
Professional League of Legends Player.....................394
B. What Can Collective Bargaining Address
and to What Categories of Employer Does
It Apply?.....................................................................395
C. Who Would Bargain? .................................................398
D. Why Bargain? ............................................................400
1. Player Mobility ....................................................401
2. Administrative Action..........................................402
E. The Potential Dark Side of Bargaining.....................405
V. Conclusion ........................................................................407
I. Introduction
Ten years ago, only a microscopic percentage of the populace
knew the term “eSports.” 1 Even today it is a term outside of
everyday parlance. 2 The popularity of eSports is on the rise,
however, and traditional sports media outlets have begun to
address the phenomenon. 3 From its humble beginnings, eSports
1. See Nick Wingfield, In E-Sports, Video Gamers Draw Real Crowds and
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Aug.
30,
2014),
Big
Money,
THE
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/technology/esports-explosion-brings-oppor
tunity-riches-for-video-gamers.html?_r=0
(noting
that,
though
game
competitions have been around for decades, eSports’ recent would have been
“unthinkable, even laughable, a few years ago”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
2. See Andy Chalk, “Esports” is Now Officially in the Dictionary,
PCGAMER, (May 7, 2015), http://www.pcgamer.com/esports-is-now-officially-inthe-dictionary/ (noting that the term ‘esports’ has only been accepted as a
recognized word recently) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
3. See Brenna Hillier, League of Legends World Championships to be
Broadcast on ESPN, VG247 (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.vg247.com/2014/10/17/
league-of-legends-world-championships-to-be-broadcast-on-espn/ (noting that
the League of Legends world championships were broadcast on the
Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN)) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Nick Schwartz,
ESPN Embraces eSports, Broadcasts Dota 2 Championship ‘The International’,
USA TODAY (July 21, 2014) (addressing ESPN’s decision to broadcast eSports
events on its streaming site) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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has grown into a multimillion dollar industry. 4 Tens of millions of
individuals watch competitive eSports, and millions of dollars are
given out in prizes alone. 5
The largest eSport program is Riot Games’ League of
Legends, which has millions of daily players. 6 League of Legends
is a free-to-play game, with micro-transactions limited to the
purchasing of cosmetic in-game items. 7 League of Legends dwarfs
its competition in a sheer size comparison, with seven to ten
times as many concurrent users as its next closest rival. 8 Due to
its size and League of Legends’ ongoing mission to advance the
eSports professional scene, 9 this note focuses on issues facing
League of Legends and its professional players.
Despite impressive player and viewership numbers, eSports
suffers from uncertainty. Specifically, it is unclear whether
eSports professional players are employees or independent
actors. 10 Employee status can provide multiple benefits for
4. Don Riddell, ESports: Global Revenue Expected to Smash $1 Billion by
2019, CNN (May 29, 2016), http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/29/sport/esportsrevolution-revenue-audience-growth/ (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
5. The Worldwide eSports Market Reaches 134 Million Viewers,
SUPERDATA (May 4, 2015), http://www.superdataresearch.com/blog/esports-brief/
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
6. Paul Tassi, Riot’s ‘League of Legends’ Reveals Astonishing 27 Million
(Jan.
27,
2014),
Daily
Players,
67
Million
Monthly,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/
insertcoin/2014/01/27/riots-league-of-legendsreveals-astonishing-27-million-daily-players-67-million-monthly/ (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
7. Id.
8. See Zoe Hawkins, Dota 2 vs League of Legends: By the Numbers,
LAZYGAMER (July 4, 2014), http://www.lazygamer.net/general-news/dota-2-vsleague-of-legends-by-the-numbers/ (noting that League of Legends had 7.5
million concurrent users, compared to Dota 2’s all-time peak of 843,024 users)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice);
Tassi, supra note 6.
9. See Jon Robinson, ‘League of Legends’ Mimics Regular Sports, ESPN
(Jan. 30, 2013), http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/tech/post/_/id/3979/league-oflegends-mimics-regu lar-sports (examining League of Legends’ promotion of
eSports as a real sport and viable professional occupation) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
10. See Bryce C. Blum & Stephen D. Fisher, The Rise of eSports: League of
Legends Article Series, FOSTER PEPPER PLLC 4 (Jan./Feb. 2014),
http://www.foster.com/documents/foster-pepper-whitepaper/riseofesportswhitepaper-fosterpepper (explaining briefly the uncertain
employment status of League of Legends professional players) (on file with the
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professional players, such as collective bargaining. 11 Given Riot
Games’ control over the League of Legends franchise and
professional scene, professional players are in a precarious
position in regards to their rights. 12 This note will examine the
current law to determine whether professional League of Legends
eSports players are employees, and how best to ensure players’
rights are protected as the eSports industry continues to expand.
II. Background
A. It’s all Geek to Me: What is League of Legends?
League of Legends is, at its core, a competitive online game
that uses real time strategy and role playing game elements. 13
League of Legends takes the form of a Multiplayer Online Battle
Arena (MOBA), which consists of two teams fighting against each
other on the same map to accomplish contrasting objectives. 14 For
current League tournament games, two teams of five players try
to destroy the opposing team’s nexus, which is protected by
various obstacles. 15
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (granting employees the right to collectively
bargain without restraint).
12. See End User License Agreement (EULA), League of Legends, LEAGUE
OF LEGENDS, http://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/legal/eula (last modified May 31,
2016) (outlining Riot Games’ substantial control over the use of the League of
Legends client) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice); see also League of Legends Championship Series: 2015 Season
Official Rules, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES (Jan. 2015),
https://riot-webstatic.s3.amazonaws.com/lolesports/Rule%20Sets/2015_LCS_Rule
_Set_2.01.pdf (providing the extensive rules governing what actions players and
teams may take to remain within the League Championship Series).
13. See What is League of Legends?, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS,
http://gameinfo.na.leagueoflegends.com/en/game-info/get-started/what-is-lol/
(last visited Sept. 12, 2016) (giving a brief overview of League of Legends’ style
of play) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
14. See Multiplayer Online Battle Arena, GIANT BOMB (Aug. 2014),
http://www.giantbomb.com/multiplayer-online-battle-arena/3015-6598/
(last
modified Dec. 12, 2015) (defining MOBAs, giving a brief history of their
development, and a list of typical gameplay elements) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
15. See David Segal, Behind League of Legends, E-Sports’s Main Attraction,
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Before the game begins, players choose from a pool of over
120 champions (and growing), and have the option to ban other
champions from play. 16 The game is played using a mouse and
keyboard. 17 As the game progresses, players gain gold by killing
AI-controlled minions and enemy player characters. 18 Items are
purchased by gold that provide additional powers to a player’s
character. 19 Teams work together to destroy objectives and gain
more gold, so that they can push into the enemy base, overcome
its defenses, and raze the enemy nexus point, winning the
game. 20 These games require strategic movement and intense
hand-eye coordination. 21
B. Professional League of Legends: The Entities Involved and the
Agreements that Govern
Professional League of Legends play involves six main actors:
sponsors, Riot Games, the League of Legends Championship
Series (LCS), the team organizations, the professional players,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/technology/riotgames-league-of-legends-main-attraction-esports.html (giving a brief overview
of the game mechanics of League of Legends) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Ranked Game, League of
Legends Wiki, http://leagueoflegends.wikia.com/wiki/Ranked_game (last visited
Sept. 12, 2016) (providing a brief explanation of the pre-game phases) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see
also Tom Giratikanon, Jon Huang & Jeremy White, Watch 10,000 League of
Legends Games in 30 Seconds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/10/technology/league-of-legendsgraphic. html (aggregating 10,000 League of Legends games and giving a brief
description of overall gameplay goals) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
16. Segal, supra note 15.
17. See New Player Guide, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, http://game
info.na.leagueoflegends.com/en/game-info/get-started/new-player-guide/
(last
visited Sept. 15, 2016) (giving brief introductory information for people new to
the game) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Segal, supra note 15 (noting the skill and coordination required to
play the game).
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and streaming sites. 22 Of these entities, three specifically deal
with players: teams, streaming sites, and the LCS. 23
The LCS is a Delaware Limited Liability Company that
establishes the rules for professional League of Legends play. 24
The LCS is a subsidiary of Riot Games, a California corporation,
and the LCS deals directly with professional players who have
qualified for the League of Legends Championship Series. 25 The
exact relationship between Riot Games and the LCS is not
precisely clear. The LCS maintains an extremely close
relationship with Riot Games, including sharing a log-in
network, 26 sharing individual employees who act on behalf of
both organizations, and mutually recognizing penalties and
regulations promulgated by each other. 27 For the purposes of this
note, and for the purposes of LCS actions, Riot Games’
regulations and rules can be treated as LCS regulations. 28
22. See Bryce Blum & Stephen Fisher, Player Contracts: Defining
Expectations to Avoid Conflict, FOSTER PEPPER PLLC 2 (Aug. 2014),
http://www.foster.com/documents/foster-pepper-white-paper/playercontracts_
definingexpectionstoavoidconflict_.aspx (giving a helpful illustration of basic
contractual relationships within the realm of League of Legends).
23. Id.
24. See League of Legends Championship Series: 2016 Season Official
Rules, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES 5 [hereinafter Season Six
Official Rules] (Dec. 18, 2015), https://riot-web-static.s3.amazonaws.
com/lolesports/Rule%20Sets/2016%20Spring%20LCS%20Rule%20Setv3_01.pdf
(introducing the LCS and defining the purpose of the LCS ruleset) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
25. See Blum & Fisher, supra note 22 (giving a helpful illustration of basic
contractual relationships and giving a very brief description of the parties).
26. Compare LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, http://na.leagueoflegends.com, with
LEAGUE OF LEGENDS CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, http://na.lolesports.com. To comment
on either of the websites, the PVP.net identity, the front-end interface for the
user, must be established. This identity is used to access the same account for
the League of Legends Client (http://i.cubeupload.com/MZC0LW.png?). Both
sites redirect to a shared support system, forum, and discussion page.
27. See, e.g., Nick Allen (“RiotNickAllen”), Competitive Ruling: Counter
Logic Gaming, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES (Dec. 10, 2014),
http://na.lolesports.com/articles/competitive-ruling-counter-logic-gaming (ruling
actions by the team, Counter Logic Gaming, as violating the LCS rules) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). Nick
Allen is the former League Operations Manager for Riot Games (see
https://twitter.com/NickAllen). Despite his title, he was also responsible for all
official rulings of the LCS. He has recently stepped down. Id.
28. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, RULE 10.2.8 (incorporating
the Riot Games’ Terms of Use, End User License Agreement, and other rules
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The LCS maintains a 10-team league in North America,
whose top-performing teams are qualified to enter the League of
Legends World Championships. 29 The LCS directly deals with the
European and North American professional scenes, and is the
governing body for the World Championships. 30 The teams that
take part in the LCS are drawn in part from the prior year’s LCS
members (the top eight teams) and in part from the winners of
the “Challenger Series,” a competition to enter the LCS. 31
The current version of the LCS contracts are kept
confidential, though the yearly rules are published for each
season. 32 The LCS adopted the policy of keeping specific contracts
secret after public uproar surrounding the leak of a “restricted
games” clause, which prohibited players from streaming online
while playing specific other games. 33 Though the restrictions
into the LCS rules).
29. See LEAGUE OF LEGENDS CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, http://na.lolesports.com
(last visited Sept. 15, 2016) (explaining the basic breakdown of teams and the
championship series) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice); Leah ‘SpiNN’ Jackson, Welcome to the 2015 Spring
Expansion Tournament!, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES (Nov. 13,
2014), http://na.lolesports.com/articles/welcome-2015-spring-expansion-tourna
ment (outlining the new Challenger Series expansion tournament, which will
increase the number of teams in the LCS from eight to ten) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
30. See LEAGUE OF LEGENDS CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, http://na.lolesports.com/
(last visited Sept. 13, 2016) (providing articles and administrative rulings on the
LCS, and live coverage of LCS events for both the European and North
American professional scenes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
31. See League of Legends Champion Series—About [hereinafter LCS
OF
LEGENDS
CHAMPIONSHIP
SERIES,
Challenger
series],
LEAGUE
http://2015.na.lolesports.com/about (last visited Sept. 13, 2016) (explaining the
challenger series and how the LCS interacts with the challenger series teams)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
Note that for the upcoming season, as the LCS is being expanded, the number
one challenger team will be automatically added to the LCS. See id.
32. See generally Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24.
33. See Cody ‘evoli’ Conners & Rod ‘slasher’ Breslau, Riot Season 4 LCS
Contracts Stipulate Players Cannot Stream Dota 2, Blizzard Games, ONGAMERS
(Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.gamespot.com/articles/riot-season-4-lcs-contractsstipulate-players-cann/1100-6436489/ (providing information on the restricted
games clause leak and its initial effect on the League of Legends community) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice);
Rory Young, League of Legends LCS Contracts Ban Streaming of Dota 2, World
NEOSEEKER
(Dec.
4,
2013),
of
Tanks,
Blizzard
Games,
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were eventually lifted, 34 the LCS has since attempted to shroud
its contract provisions from the public. Despite this secrecy, the
LCS’ interactions with players and teams are largely based on
their published rules and the League of Legends “Summoner’s
Code” as outlined in the Riot Games’ end user license agreement
(EULA). 35 Finally, the LCS also envisions player management by
their respective teams, as outlined in a teams’ “Player
Agreement.” 36 These groups of contracts, and the LCS challenger
system, govern professional League of Legends play in the United
States. 37
Lastly, it is important to note that League of Legends players
are most likely employees of their respective LCS team. 38 Teams
provide pay for services, and exercise high levels of control over
players. 39 Even if professional players have an employment
relationship with their teams, this relationship does not prevent
http://www.neoseeker.com/news/24256-league-of-legends-lcs-contracts-ban-stream
ing-of-dota-2-world-of-tanks-blizzard-games/ (reporting on the League of Legends’
community’s response to the contract leak) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
34. See Travis Gafford, Riot Games Reverses Course on LCS Player
Streaming Policy—Players Are Now “Free to Stream Any Games They Want”,
ONGAMERS
(Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.gamespot.com/articles/riot-gamesreverses-course-on-lcs-player-streaming/1100-6436520/ (reporting that Riot
Games and the LCS had removed the streaming provision).
35. See End User License Agreement (EULA), League of Legends, supra
note 12.
36. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 4 (containing multiple
provisions that specifically fall outside the LCS agreement and should be
addressed in the player agreement).
OF
LEGENDS
CHAMPIONSHIP
SERIES,
37. See
About,
LEAGUE
http://gameinfo.na.leagueoflegends.com/en/game-info/ (last visited Sept. 13,
2016) (describing how League of Legends works) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
38. Infra Part III.B.3.
39. See Jimmy Thang, League of Legends - Team Curse Interview,
MAXIMUM PC (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.pcgamer.com/league-of-legends-teamcurse-interview/ (noting that the players on Team Curse practiced on average of
twelve to fourteen hours per day, which was orchestrated and controlled by
Team Curse management); Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, at § 2.2
(noting that teams provide pay to players, as well as the money provided by
LCS, and that “nothing in [the LCS rules] is intended in any way to limit the
compensation a team pays to its players”); see also Season Six Official Rules,
supra note 24, at § 4.1 (“[E]ach team shall be responsible for making any and all
payments to its players which are required by its Player Agreements.”).
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professional players from also having a legally recognized
employment relationship with another entity. 40 This note does
not address the relationship between teams and their players, it
only seeks to determine the employment status of players in
relation to Riot Games and the LCS.
III. Analysis: Are Professional League of Legends Players
Employees of Riot Games?
A. Laws that Govern
Though the specific LCS contracts are kept secret, other Riot
Games contracts, such as the Terms of Use (ToU) and EULA, 41
state that the laws of the United States of America and the State
of California shall apply to those agreements without regard to
conflict of law principles. 42 The ToU and EULA also reject the
application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods. 43 As such, the issue of
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012) (listing the categories of employee that are
not recognized by the National Labor Relations Act, which does not contain a
prohibition against multiple employment relations); 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2012)
(listing the substantial group of individuals not covered by the Fair Labor
Standards Act, but containing no provisions against holding multiple
employment relations). In fact, the FLSA can cause employers to become
financially liable for claims brought by an employee in connection to a second or
third employer. Gregory W. McClune, Serving Two Masters Can Trigger
&
LARDNER
LLP
(July
18,
2011),
Overtime
Claims,
FOLEY
http://www.laboremploymentperspectives.com/2011/07/18/serving-two-masterscan-trigger-overtime-claims/ (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
41. Nota Bene: Terms of Use and End User License Agreements provide
the contractual framework that governs the relationship between a game owner
and its players. League of Legends players are actually using a service provided
by Riot Games (the League of Legends client). These agreements outline under
what terms the service can be used (covered by the ToU) and the extent to which
the license to use that service may be exercised (covered by the EULA). See
sources cited infra note 42 (explaining the Terms of Use and the End User
License Agreement).
42. End User License Agreement (EULA), League of Legends, LEAGUE OF
LEGENDS § XV(G), http://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/legal/eula (last modified
May 31, 2016); Terms of Use Agreement (ToU), League of Legends, LEAGUE OF
LEGENDS § XV(G), http://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/legal/termsofuse (last
modified May 31, 2016).
43. End User License Agreement (EULA), supra note 42 (rejecting the
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employment for professional League of Legends players
necessarily turns on the employment definitions of California and
Federal Law.
B. Applicable California Employment Law
1. Definitions of Employees
The California Labor Code defines an employee as every
person in the service of an employer under any oral or written
appointment or contract of hire, express or implied. 44
Employment status extends even to aliens and minors. 45
Contractually specified relationships do not affect the
determination of an employment relationship for statutory
purposes. 46
2. Proving Employment
Once a plaintiff comes forward with evidence that he or she
provided services for an employer, the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case that the relationship was one of
employer/employee. 47 The burden then shifts to the employer,
which may prove that the presumed employee was an
independent contractor. 48 Proving employment relies heavily on
application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, though recognizing that additional laws may apply if the game is
accessed from another country); Terms of Use Agreement (TOU), supra note 42
(same).
44. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351 (West 2015).
45. Id. § 3351(a).
46. See Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[S]tatutes
enacted to confer special benefits on workers are ‘designed to defeat rather than
implement contractual arrangements.’” (quoting Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835
F.2d 1529, 1545 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring))).
47. Id. at 900 (citing Robinson v. George, 105 P.2d 914, 917 (Cal. 1940);
Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 754 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Once a
plaintiff comes forward with evidence that he provided services for an employer,
the employee has established a prima facie case that the relationship was one of
employer/employee.”); Cristler v. Express Messenger Sys., Inc., 171 Cal. App.
4th 72, 83 (2009).
48. Narayan, 616 F.3d at 900 (citing Cristler, 171 Cal. App. 4th at 89)
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the control of the employer over the alleged employee. 49 The
Supreme Court of California listed an additional series of factors
for determining control, based off the Restatement of Agency. 50
The factors considered by the Court are: a) whether or not the one
performing the services is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business; b) the kind of occupation that normally performs the
work in question; c) the skill required in the particular
occupation; d) which party supplies the tools and place of work;
e) the length of time for which the services are to be performed;
f) the method of payment (whether by time or by the job);
g) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
principal; and h) whether or not the parties believe they are
creating an employer/employee relationship. 51
Though this control test was a helpful addition to the
jurisprudence, it was soon found to be lacking in certain areas. 52
The Supreme Court of California noted that applying the control
test “rigidly and in isolation” was often of “little use in evaluating
the wide variety of service arrangements.” 53 To solve this issue,
the Supreme Court of California enumerated a number of
“secondary” indicia of an employment relationship, which were
similar to the control test. 54 Of these, the right to discharge at
(“[O]nce the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer . . . [to prove] that the presumed employee was an independent
contractor”); see Bemis v. People, 240 P.2d 638, 644 (1952) (“It is also the law
that, generally speaking, . . . when a prima facie case of employment has been
established, the burden shifts to the one claiming that the so-called employee
was in fact an independent contractor”) (citations omitted).
49. See Tieberg v. Unemp’t Ins. App. Bd., 471 P.2d 975, 977 (Cal. 1970)
(“The principal test of an employment relationship is whether the person to
whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of
accomplishing the result desired.”).
50. See id. at 979 (listing factors for determining the employee relationship
from the Restatement of Agency).
51. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220 (1933)) (listing the
factors to determine control).
52. See S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399,
404 (Cal. 1989) (noting the control test could not adequately address all types of
service arrangements).
53. Id.
54. See id. (explaining that, while the right to control work may be the
“more significant” consideration, several other indicia are useful in determining
the nature of a service relationship).

370

22 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 359 (2016)

will, without cause, was deemed paramount. 55 The Supreme
Court of California also found five other indicia, originally
adopted in other jurisdictions, helpful, including: 1) the alleged
employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on his
managerial skill; 2) the alleged employee’s investment in
equipment or materials required for the task, or the employment
of helpers; 3) whether the service rendered requires a special
skill; 4) the degree of permanence in the working relationship;
and 5) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the
alleged employer’s business. 56 Though varying in their
importance, these factors must be assessed and weighed
together. 57
3. League of Legends Players, Teams, and the California
Employment Factors
Accordingly, it must first be determined whether League of
Legends Professional Players can prove the prima facie case for
employment. 58 Marc Merrill, a Riot Games co-founder and the
company president, stated that the LCS tournaments, though a
money loser for the company, function as a marketing tool. 59
Though Riot Games and the LCS strive to make the LCS more
profitable, and charge admission to spectators that attend events
live, Riot Games largely uses the LCS to inspire enthusiasts and
bring additional players into the game. 60 In order for the LCS to
perform this goal, it must have professional players to play in its
55. See Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing S.G.
Borello, 760 P.2d at 404) (noting that the Supreme Court determined the right
to “discharge at will” to be most important among the secondary indicia).
56. Id. at 900–02.
57. See id. at 901 (noting the factors must be weighed together and not
applied as separate tests); S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus.
Relations,769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989) (quoting Germann v. Worker’s Comp.
Appeals Bd., 123 Cal. App. 3d 776, 783 (1981)) (“Generally, . . . the individual
factors cannot be applied mechanically as separate tests; they are intertwined
and their weight depends often on particular combinations.”).
58. Infra Part III.B.2.
59. Segal, supra note 15.
60. Id. As the LCS has been slowly making more money for Riot Games
each year, it is possible that the LCS could become independently profitable
within a few years’ time.
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games. 61 Because professional players and teams provide, at the
very least, services in the form of marketing, they seem to satisfy
the prima facie case for employment in California, which requires
“services” rendered for an employer. 62 As the LCS becomes more
profitable, this service relationship should only strengthen.
According to the LCS rules, no employees of Riot Games may
participate in an LCS event. 63 The LCS rules go further, banning
any employee of an affiliate of Riot Games from participating in
the LCS as well. 64 It is clear from this provision of the LCS that
the parties do not believe they are creating an employer/employee
relationship. 65 The relationship-defining language of the contract,
however, does not determine the employer/employee relationship
for the purpose of the California Labor Code. 66 Thus, the two
inquiries to consider are the measures of control exercised over
potential employees and the business indicia exhibited by the
relationship. 67 The analysis for professional League of Legends
players thus has two prongs: determining whether the LCS has
an employment relationship with LCS teams, and whether the
LCS has an employment relationship with professional players.

61. Id. High level play helps to inspire enthusiasts and bring spectators
and the LCS models provides stability for players entering that profession.
62. See Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
Robinson v. George, 105 P.2d 914, 917 (Cal. 1940)) (“Once a plaintiff comes
forward with evidence that he provided services for an employer, the employee
has established a prima facie case that the relationship was one of
employer/employee.”); Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 754 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th
Cir. 2014).
63. Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 1.4.
64. See id. (defining an affiliate as any entity which owns or controls, is
under the ownership or control of, or is under common ownership or control with
Riot Games).
65. See Tieberg v. Unemp’t Ins. App. Bd., 471 P.2d 975, 979 (Cal. 1970)
(citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220 (1933)) (finding that parties’ belief
that they are creating an employer/employee relationship is one of the indicia of
the control relationship). Note that the LCS, as a subsidiary of Riot Games, is
likely considered an affiliate by the company.
66. See Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[S]tatutes
enacted to confer special benefits on workers are ‘designed to defeat rather than
implement contractual arrangements’” (quoting Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835
F.2d 1529, 1545 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring))).
67. Supra Part III.B.2.
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a. League of Legends Teams

Does the LCS exert sufficient control over LCS teams to
render them employees? The LCS arranges for teams to receive
compensation for participating in the League of Legends
Championship Series. 68 The amount given to teams is not known
by the LCS, and is arranged via a “Team Agreement.” 69 Teams
must also pay players a “Minimum Player Compensation,”
consisting of at least $12,500 to its starting players (which is
provided by the LCS to the team as part of their compensation
via the Team Agreement). 70 Teams may provide additional
compensation to players, but that is not addressed by the LCS
agreement. 71 Finally, the agreement also stipulates that two
teams in different LCS regions, with the same owner, may not
use the same name. 72
Beyond monetary control, the LCS also controls aspects of
publicity and team roster management. 73 Failure to abide by
these LCS rules can result in fines for LCS teams. 74 League
teams are given certain deadlines that must be observed when
switching player positions, although flexibility exists in the form
of temporary substitutions. 75
Excluding the initial subsidy of base player salaries, team
income is largely unregulated by the LCS. 76 Sponsorship deals
68. Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 2.
69. Id. §§ 2.1, 4.1 (specifically noting that the LCS agreement does not take
into account or inhibit the payment teams provide players in their agreements).
70. Id. § 2.2.
71. See id. § 2.2, 4.1 (noting that the LCS does not address the amounts
paid to players in other contracts between the player and team).
72. Id. § 3.1.
73. Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 4; see id. at 56–57 (providing
example forms for roster trades, acquisitions, and player demotions/promotions).
74. See, e.g., Nick Allen (“RiotNickAllen”), NA LCS Competitive Ruling—
Andy “Reginald” Dinh, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://na.lolesports.com/articles/na-lcs-competitive-ruling-andy-%E2%80%9 Creg
inald%E2%80%9D-dinh (fining a League of Legend team’s owner for failing to
abide by the LCS roster change rules) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
75. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 4 (providing rules for
temporary substitutions when unforeseen issues arise).
76. See id., § 2.2 (“Nothing in these Rules is intended in any way to limit
the compensation a team pays to its players.”).
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occur outside of LCS supervision, and are negotiated by teams
and the sponsors alone. 77 Teams provide their own practice
equipment to players, who only use some LCS provided
equipment at tournaments. 78 Teams are also, typically, worth far
more than the money provided them by the LCS, 79 which, under
the control test, suggests that teams function more akin to
Independent Contractors than employees. 80
Given this autonomy and the monetary stakes, it seems
difficult to classify teams participating in the League
Championship Series as LCS employees. The LCS may provide
teams with some funds, but that money must go to players under
the LCS rules. 81 Though the LCS can fine improper roster
switches, and defines the procedure for establishing and
77. See Jack Etienne, Air Force Reserve Sponsors League of Legends
Gaming Team, Cloud 9, CLOUD 9 HYPERX (May 2014), http://cloud9.gg/news/airforce-reserve-sponsors-c9 (explaining that Cloud 9 and the Air Force Reserve
entered into a sponsor relationship, without mentioning approval or interaction
with the LCS) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
78. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 5 (noting what
equipment is provided by LCS at tournaments and what equipment is provided
by teams).
79. The actual value of teams is hard to determine, given their private
nature and the high number of sponsorship relationships. A rough estimate of
only website traffic can provide some insight. See How Much is Solomid.net
Worth, WORTH OF WEB CALCULATOR, http://www.worthofweb.com/websitevalue/solomid.net (last visited Sept. 14, 2016) (valuing website traffic revenue of
Team Solo Mid, a League of Legends Team, at over $ 47,000) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). The vast
majority of team value, however, comes from sponsorships. Tournament
winnings also augment team value, see Riot League Championship Series/North
America/2014 Season/Spring playoffs, LEAGUEPEDIAhttp://lol.gamepedia.com/
Riot_League_Championship_Series/North_America/2014_Season/Spring_Playo
ffs (last modified Sept. 21, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice); Riot League Championship Series/North
America/2014/Summer Playoffs, LEAGUEPEDIA http://lol.gamepedia.com/
Riot_League_Championship_Series/North_America/2014_Season/Summer_Play
offs (last modified Sept. 21, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal
of Civil Rights and Social Justice). The top two teams from each tournament
took $75,000 in total prize winnings. Id.
80. See Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting
that the amount of money which the entity earns by its own skill, rather than a
salary for the company, weighs toward considering an entity an independent
contractor rather than employee).
81. Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, at 10.
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managing the roster, the LCS cannot mandate employee salary
beyond the minimum amount, and does not control practice
methods of teams. 82 The indicia of control, as outlined above, do
not seem present to label the relationship between the LCS and
participating teams as a control relationship. 83
Other indicia must be considered, however, before
determining that LCS teams are not employees for the purposes
of California law. 84 Paramount to this analysis is the right to
discharge at will. 85 Currently, no LCS team has ever been
discharged. The harshest rebuke suffered by any team has been a
fine. 86 Though it remains possible for the LCS to ban a team from
playing, 87 effectively discharging them, it is unclear as to whether
this would or could ever occur.
Though teams may theoretically be free from banning, the
permanence of their relationship with the LCS is volatile. Teams
are eliminated from the LCS if they cannot maintain a high level
of play. 88 This uncertainty means that a team’s success, both on
the field and in obtaining sponsorship and compensation from the
LCS, is highly based on the team’s own skill and ability to recruit
and train skilled players. Coupled with the tempered autonomy
teams enjoy when determining their rosters, League of Legends
teams seem to fall outside of the employee determination under
the Supreme Court of California’s additional indicia. 89 As such,
82. See Thang, supra note 39 (noting the players on team curse practiced
on average of 12–14 hours per day). The LCS Official rules do not specifically
cover practice schedules of teams. See generally Season Six Official Rules, supra
note 24.
83. See supra Part III.B.2.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Allen, Competitive Ruling: Counter Logic Gaming, supra note 27
(fining the LCS team Counter Logic Gaming for violating the LCS rules).
87. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 11 (noting that the LCS
maintains sole discretion over punishment for misconduct); see, e.g., Nick Allen,
Competitive Ruling: Counter Logic Gaming, supra note 27 (fining the team
Counter Logic Gaming $10,000 dollars for prohibited conduct under the LCS
rules).
88. See LCS Challenger Series, supra note 31 (noting that the last teams in
the LCS bracket are demoted to the challenger series, and that the penultimate
team must defend its position against a challenger team).
89. See Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 900–01 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dept. of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal.
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the LCS cannot use its control over LCS teams to establish an
employment relationship with professional players. 90 The
analysis now turns to the relationship between professional
League of Legends players and the LCS.
b. League of Legends Players
Compared to teams, League of Legends professional players
have a closer relationship to the LCS. The LCS mandates
minimum salaries that players receive. 91 Players are also
governed by the ToU, the EULA, the “Summoner’s Code,” and
specific player conduct provisions entered into upon downloading
the League of Legends client. 92 The penalties for violating these
mandatory conduct codes may be assigned by the LCS at its sole
discretion. 93 Though the LCS provides a list of potential penalties
to players, this list of penalties does not limit the LCS’s sole
authority to issue other penalties as it sees fit. 94
The effect of these penalties can be extreme. The most typical
form of punishment is a fine, which often amounts to thousands
of dollars. 95 As the LCS incorporates ToU and EULA violations, it
is even possible for the LCS to enact harsher penalties, including
bans. 96 Given that players typically rely on League of Legends
1989)) (outlining the additional indicia when evaluating an employer/employee
relationship).
90. Id.
91. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 2.2 (setting aside
$12,500 per player for each half of the tournament year).
92. See id. § 10 (outlining a long list of prohibited conduct); see also id.
§ 10.2.8 (incorporating the ToU, EULA, Summoner’s Code, and other rules of
League of Legends).
93. Id. § 10.4.
94. Id. § 10.5.
95. See Allen, League of Legends Competition Ruling: Counter Logic
Gaming, supra note 27 (fining four of the five members of the Counter Logic
Gaming team $1,250 for violating the League of Legends ToU).
96. See End User License Agreement League of Legends, supra note 42, at
§ V(E) (listing a series of responses that Riot Games may take in response to
violation of the EULA, including banning); Terms of Use League of Legends,
supra note 42, at §V(E) (same); see also Scott Parkin (“Riot aBhorsen”), League
of Legends Competition Ruling — Suspension of Nukeduck and Mithy, League of
Legends
(June
2,
2014),
http://forums.euw.leagueoflegends.com/board/showthread.php?t=1749326
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play (whether professional or streaming) to make a living, a ban
is a very serious punishment. 97
The ability to ban (effectively ejecting a player permanently
from the professional scene) provides the LCS a higher level of
control over players, akin to discharge. 98 Because of this higher
level of control, determining whether professional League of
Legends players are employees becomes more complicated and
nuanced. The analysis must consider both the control of the
potential employer over its employees, as well as the secondary
indicia listed by the California Supreme Court. 99 As control is a
particularly difficult area of analysis, consisting of multiple subparts, it is prudent to address that issue first.
i. The Multipart Control Test
Perhaps the most vexing question involving League of
Legends professional players is whether they are engaged in a
distinct occupation or business. 100 Though all professional League
of Legends players compete in tournaments and receive the
minimum mandatory compensation required by the LCS, many
other players also work as professional streamers. 101 Some
(suspending two challenger series players for the use of “highly offensive
language” as prohibited under the League of Legends ToU and EULA) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
97. See Tim Chester, Want to Make $200,000 killing blue monsters? Here’s
How, GQ (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/entertainment/
articles/2014-02-/19/professional-video-gaming-salary (noting that Michael
Santana [Imaqtpie], a professional League of Legends player on Team Dignitas
at that time, streamed and played League of Legends as his profession) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
98. Infra Part III.B.2.
99. See Tierberg v. Unemp’t Ins. App. Bd., 471 P.2d 975, 977 (Cal. 1970)
(reviewing the issue of control); S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus.
Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989) (reviewing the issue of secondary
indicia).
100. See Tierberg, 471 P.2d 975, 979 (Cal. 1970) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF AGENCY § 220 (1933)) (outlining the list of factors for control, specifically
whether a potential employee is engaged in the distinct occupation).
101. See Chester, supra note 97 (noting that Michael Santana [Imaqtpie], a
professional League of Legends player on Team Dignitas at that time, made
$8,000 from streaming in a month); Brett Farrow, League of Legends Streamer
Stats: December 2014, GAMURS (Apr. 7, 2016), https://gamurs.com/articles
/league-of-legends-streamer-stats-december-2014 (giving viewer counts and time
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players even write articles or guides for websites. 102 Despite the
many hats that professional LCS players may wear, not all
players participate in these activities. At minimum, all
professional players participate in the occupation of playing
League of Legends at a professional level, which in turn requires
an incredible amount of skill. 103 This skill does not translate
smoothly to professional play of similar game types. 104 The
specificity of these skills, which are only applicable toward
League of Legends, thus connotes an employer/employee level of
control over professional players. 105
Continuing the control test analysis: what are the tools and
place of work for a professional eSports player? Pro League of
Legends players practice in locations chosen by their teams,
using their own, or team-owned equipment (which is then
replaced during tournaments with LCS equipment). 106 However,
this equipment may not be used to play in a tournament without
access to the League of Legends game client, as access to the
client is required to play the game. Access to the client is
controlled by Riot Games, the LCS, and is further governed by
data on popular League of Legends streamers, which are dominated by
professional players) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice); Alex Magdaleno, Playing Video Games is a Full-Time
Job for this Twitch Streamer, MASHABLE (Mar. 27, 2014), http://mashable.com/
2014/03/27/twitch-streamers/ (giving example income figures for various
streamers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
102. See Yannlck Le Jacq, Beginner’s Tips for Playing League of Legends
(May 8, 2015), http://kotaku.com/a-beginner-s-guide-to-league-of-legends1703090875 (giving advice on how to get started playing League of Legends) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
103. See Tierberg 471 P.2d 975, 977 (Cal. 1970) (listing the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY factors, specifically the degree of skill and training
necessary to perform the particular work). Where the skill required is
specialized and not easily transferrable, this suggests an employer/employee
relationship.
104. Skill in League of Legends does not translate to skill in another video
game. Some mechanical proficiencies, such as actions per minute (APM), may
carry over, in much the same way that the athleticism of a football player may
help that player pick up a new sport. Actual professional level play, however,
would take significant training and resources to achieve.
105. Infra Part III.B.2.
106. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 5.1 (explaining what
materials are provided by the LCS).
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the EULA, ToU, and Summoner’s Code. 107 Unlike traditional
sports, where a team can actively train without using leagueowned equipment, professional League of Legends players must
have access to the game client. 108 This suggests that Riot Games
and the LCS supply the critical tool for professional players to
perform the necessary part of their work, which tilts toward
finding an employee relationship. 109
The method of payment and length of time for which services
are to be performed 110 are clearer cut issues, though still
somewhat nebulous. The LCS rules agreement provides $12,500
to each starting player at the start of each split. 111 There are two
splits per year, the “spring” and “summer” splits, which each
contain a promotion series, the actual split, and then a playoff
series. 112 Each season is 11 weeks in length, with roughly four
additional weeks of play for the promotion and playoffs. 113 The
LCS rules contract lasts for each overall “season,” containing both
spring and summer splits. 114 This amounts to roughly 30 weeks of
play per year, with $25,000 in salary (not including players
maintaining good conduct in the off-season, as is required under

107. See id. § 10.2.8 (noting that the obligations listed in the LCS rules, the
EULA, and the ToU apply to professional players).
108. Though it is theoretically possible for a team to only practice its handeye coordination and clicks per minute (which would not require the game
client), no team could adequately maintain its standing in the LCS without the
ability to actually practice the game.
109. See Tieberg v. Unemp’t Ins. App. Bd., 471 P.2d 975, 979 (Cal. 1970)
(citing the factor of who supplies the tools and place of work). An independent
contractor would be expected to supply his or her own tools. Id. at 982.
110. See id. (listing the factor of method of payment, and whether payment
is by time or by the job).
111. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 2.2.
112. See Riot League Championship Series North America 2014,
LEAGUEPEDIA,
http://lol.gamepedia.com/Riot_League_Championship_Series
/NorthAmerica/2014_Season/Spring_Round_Robin (last modified Sept. 21, 2015)
(providing an overview of the spring and summer splits, as well as statistics on
wins, losses, weeks of play, and team composition) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
113. Id.
114. See Riot League Championship Series North America 2014, supra note
112 (providing an overview of the total season, which consists of the spring and
summer splits: ten week periods of professional League of Legends tournament
play, with prizes awarded to the top teams at the end of each split).
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the Summoner’s Code). 115 Players may receive prizes if their team
wins the playoffs, but any team in the LCS receives salary
benefits regardless of how the job is performed. 116 Poor
performance in the LCS risks a player’s team being dropped from
the LCS, rather than salary cuts. 117 Given that most teams are
not relegated from the LCS, 118 and teams are paid for the entire
time they remain in the LCS (not just for particular games), this
cuts toward finding an employer/employee level of control (as
employers typically hire independent contractors on a job-by-job
basis, not anticipating a continued default future relationship). 119
To complete the analysis, the identity of the principal in the
employment relationship must be ascertained. 120 Professional
League of Legends players are bound to the LCS via the rules
agreement. 121 The LCS can discipline players for acting outside of
this agreement, it can act as a necessary intermediary regarding
player mobility, and it can set the minimum salary for players
(and for some players, this is the majority of income they
receive). 122 Given the level of control the LCS exerts over players,
which the LCS uses to advertise League of Legends, 123 the LCS
would function as the principal. 124
115. Id.
116. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 2.2 (providing payment
to players for time played in the split, without considering performance).
117. See LCS Challenger Series, supra note 31 (outlining the procedure for
rotations into and out of the LCS).
118. See Counter Logic Gaming, LEAGUEPEDIA, http://lol.gamepedia.com/
Counter_Logic_Gaming (last modified Sept. 8, 2016), (noting that Counter Logic
Gaming (CLG), a League of Legends eSports team, was founded in April, 2010,
making it the oldest League of Legends team still active) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
119. See Tierberg v. Unemp’t Ins. App. Bd., 471 P.2d 975, 980 (Cal. 1970)
(citing Isenberg v. Cal. Emp’t Stabilization Comm’n, 180 P.2d 11 (Cal. 1947))
(noting that jockey contracts, which had automatic renewal provisions, were
evidence of an employer/employee relationship).
120. See id. (listing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY factors).
121. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, at 5 (explaining that the
official rules apply to all teams who have qualified to play in the LCS).
122. See id. §§ 2.2, 4, 10 (outlining player compensation, player mobility, and
penalties, respectively).
123. See Segal, supra note 15 (explaining that the main purpose of the LCS
is to advertise League of Legends by showcasing the game in competitive
matches with professional players).
124. It is possible that Riot Games could be the principal of these players, as
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Considering these factors as a whole, the LCS sufficiently
controls League of Legends professional players to satisfy the
control aspect of the employment analysis. Professional players
are engaged in distinct occupations and skills only marketable to
the LCS, must use the League of Legends client to practice, are
engaged in continuing contracts with the potential to last
indefinitely, and are a crucial part of the LCS’s business. 125 Next
the secondary indicia, as outlined above, must be considered. 126
ii. The Secondary Indicia
The paramount secondary indicium is the right to discharge
at will, without cause. 127 This right does not seem present in the
LCS agreements. 128 The LCS and Riot Games exercise a wide
berth of discretion over player conduct, as evidenced by the
expansive conditions of the Summoner’s Code, EULA, and ToU. 129
The code of conduct specifically explains that “transmitting or
communicating any content which, in the sole and exclusive
discretion of Riot Games, is deemed offensive” is a violation. 130
Such violations can result in bans from the LCS. 131 For example,
it exerts control over the LCS (which is a subsidiary of Riot Games). The exact
nature of the control relationship between the two is not public knowledge,
however there is a high likelihood that the LCS functions as an agent of Riot
Games (as mentioned in Section II). As control by the LCS is required for such a
relationship in the first place, however, and would successfully create an
employment relationship, this analysis will only focus on the relationship
between the LCS and players.
125. Supra Part III.B.3.b.i.
126. See S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399,
404 (Cal. 1989) (listing the secondary indicia).
127. See Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting
that the right to discharge an employee without cause is the most important
factor of the control test).
128. See generally Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24 (no clause of the
LCS rules specifically allows for discharge at will, without cause).
129. End User License Agreement League of Legends, supra note 42, at
§ XV(G); Terms of Use Agreement (ToU), League of Legends, supra note 42, at
§ XV. These agreements provide wide latitude in determining what content is
offensive, and thus bannable.
130. End User License Agreement League of Legends, supra note 42, at
§ XV(G); Terms of Use League of Legends, supra note 42, at § XV(E).
131. Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 10.
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two professional players were suspended for using offensive
language in the summer of 2014, essentially ending their ability
to perform in the LCS summer split. 132 This suggests that
though a player may not be fired absolutely at will, the right to
discharge is extremely expansive. 133 Given the expansive nature
of the right, the LCS falls extremely close to satisfying this
indicium. 134
Additional indicia address the actual nature of the working
relationship in action, such as the investment in tools, the skills
required to perform the work, and the degree of permanence in
the work. 135 Professional players invest in their own equipment
for practicing, though they must use the League of Legends
Client in order to effectively access the game. 136 Similarly, the
working relationship of a player and the LCS lasts as long as
the player maintains good behavior, coupled with his or her
team maintaining a high level of play (which is influenced by
the skills of each player). 137 In this way, the permanence of the
relationship between the parties is somewhat shaky, though the
rotation of a team out of the LCS happens only after a split
concludes, and does not affect 80% of the teams. 138 At minimum,
132. See Parkin, supra note 96 (suspending Alfonso Rodriguez and Elrend
Holm from the LCS and the Challenger series through the end of 2014).
133. E.g., End User License Agreement League of Legends, supra note 42, at
§ VII(B) (noting that Riot Games may alter, add, and interpret the code of
conduct at its sole discretion).
134. Supra Part III.B.2.
135. See S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399,
404 (Cal. 1989) (listing secondary indicia beyond the initial indicia of control).
136. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 5.2 (listing player-owned
equipment such as PC keyboards, PC mice and cordholders, and mouse pads
that may be brought into the LCS); Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24,
§ 5.1 (noting that LCS material may be provided, but only during official
gameplay activities); End User License Agreement League of Legends, supra note
42, § III (listing additional licensing limitations); Terms of Use League of
Legends, supra note 42, § III (prohibiting parties from providing use or access to
the League of Legends client via means not-provided by Riot Games).
137. See LCS Challenger Series, supra note 31 (noting that the last and
penultimate teams in the LCS bracket are demoted to the challenger series);
Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 10 (incorporating the Summoner’s
Code and a set of conduct that must be followed to maintain good standing and
the ability to play in the LCS); see also supra Part III.B.3.b.i. (analyzing the
extensive skill required to play at a professional level).
138. See LCS Challenger Series, supra note 31 (noting that the last team in
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however, players maintain a split-long relationship with the
LCS. 139
The last factor to consider in the secondary indicia analysis is
the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss. 140 As
mentioned above, professional League of Legends players have
many avenues for potential profit (such as streaming, writing
articles, etc.). 141 However, professional players have their
baseline income established by the LCS. 142 Thus a professional
League of Legends player’s potential for profit or loss is limited
solely, with regards to the LCS, to whether or not the player’s
team manages to successfully place within the top three teams of
the split (which will earn the team prize money). 143 In this
fashion, these rewards function as bonuses or incentives to
performing well, but losing such events does not have a negative
effect on the player’s income for that split. 144
Considering the secondary indicia as a whole, the evidence
leans toward considering professional League of Legends players
to be employees. 145 At the very least, the LCS appears to exert
sufficient control over players to preclude them from being typical
independent contractors. 146 Coupled with the level of control
exercised over professional League of Legends players, it seems

the LCS bracket, after the 10-week split, is demoted to the challenger series,
while the penultimate team must best a challenger team to remain in the
bracket). Overall the LCS has an 80% retention rate per split (or higher as
challenger teams fail to beat the penultimate teams in most cases). Id.
139. See id. (noting relegation occurs after the season ends).
140. See S.G. Borello, 769 P.2d at 404 (listing the secondary indicia).
141. Supra Part III.B.3.b.i.
142. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24 at § 2.2.
143. See Riot League Championship Series/North America/2014
Season/Spring playoffs, supra note 79 (explaining that the top three teams in
the League receive a portion of the prize money for that split).
144. See Season Six Offical Rules, supra note 24, § 2.2 (noting that the
$12,500 given to players for a split does not consider team standing); see also
LCS Challenger Series, supra note 31 (explaining that the relegation of teams
from the LCS occurs after the split itself). As the LCS currently consists of ten
teams, this means that five teams (placing fourth through eighth) automatically
remain in the LCS even though they do not receive prizes for finishing in first,
second, or third.
145. Supra Part III.B.3.b.i.
146. See supra Part III.B.3.b. (assessing the control of the LCS over players).
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apt to consider these player employees of the LCS. Professional
League of Legends players are employees under California law.
C. Applicable Federal Employment Laws
The United States contains multiple labor regimes designed
to protect employees. These regimes provide additional rights to
employees, particularly the right of collective bargaining. 147
These laws apply even if entities have attempted to implement
contractual arrangements to eliminate them. 148 Such rights can
have profound effects on the employee-employer relationship, as
well as the industry involved. 149 For such rights to attach,
however, two analyses must be completed. First, the industry
must sufficiently impact interstate commerce so as to grant
Federal Jurisdiction over the regulation of that industry. 150
Second, the individuals to be covered must satisfy the definition
of applicable employees under the acts that govern. 151
1. League of Legends Tournaments and Interstate Commerce
The Federal Government has the power to regulate the
channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as well as
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 152 The
147. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (declaring the rights of employees to selforganize and bargain collectively for their mutual aid or protection).
148. See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1545 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) (noting that statutes enacted to confer special
benefits on workers are “designed to defeat rather than implement contractual
arrangements.”).
149. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
150. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 (enumerating power to the federal government
to regulate commerce among the several states, foreign nations, and Indian
tribes).
151. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012) (explaining
that the definition of employee, as used in the Act, applies only to those that
meet the definition provided therein).
152. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 (providing congress the power to “regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian tribes.”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (“Congress’
commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce . . . .) (internal citations omitted).
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internet is one such instrumentality. 153 Most professional sports
have been recognized to have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 154 The LCS broadcasts content via Twitch, Azubu, and
Youtube to millions of viewers all over the globe, 155 in a format
mimicking professional sports. 156 LCS games provide income to
Riot Games 157 and online broadcasters 158 in their various
locations around the globe. Given that commerce clause-based
jurisdiction has been granted for activities having less effect on
interstate commerce, 159 LCS tournaments more than likely
substantially affect interstate and international commerce for the
purposes of Federal Labor law.

153. See, e.g., United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 953–54 (9th Cir.
2007) (noting the internet is an instrumentality of commerce); United States v.
Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. MacEwan,
445 F.3d 237, 245 (3rd Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d
1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004) (same).
154. See Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1206 (1971)
(recognizing basketball as affecting interstate commerce); Deesen v. Prof’l
Golfers’ Ass’n of Am., 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966) (recognizing golf as affecting
interstate commerce); Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452
(1957) (recognizing football as affecting interstate commerce for the purposes of
the Sherman Antitrust Act); United States v. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S.
236, 244–45, 247 (1955) (recognizing boxing as affecting interstate commerce
and specifically noting that boxing promoters made “substantial utilization of
the channels of interstate trade and commerce.”); Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352
F.Supp. 870, 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (recognizing hockey as affecting interstate
commerce for purposes of the Sherman Antitrust Act).
155. See Segal, supra note 15 (noting the different ways by which the LCS is
broadcast); see Travis Gifford, League of Legends 2014 World Championship
(Dec.
1,
2014),
Viewer
Numbers
(Infograph),
GAMESPOT
http://www.gamespot.com/articles/league-of-legends-2014-world-championshipviewer-n/1100-6438540/ (showing 27 million unique viewers for the finals match
alone, as well as 11.2 million concurrent viewers at peak viewership).
156. See Robinson, supra note 9 (noting the aspects of eSports that are akin
to real sports).
157. See Segal, supra note 15 (noting the nature of the LCS and how it
works).
158. See Gifford, supra note 155 (noting that over 40 broadcasters covered
the world championship tournament).
159. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2579 (citing Wickard v. Filburn.
37 U.S. 111 (1942)) (noting that government commerce power can be expansive,
and can even extend to a farmer’s decision to grow wheat solely for his own
consumption, given the effect that such growth has on commerce).
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2. The NLRA Definitions of an Employee
If League of Legends play is within the government’s
purview, are professional players employees under Federal Law?
The law governing this issue is the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”). 160 The NLRA was passed in 1935 (and amended over
time) to protect the rights of employees and employers, encourage
collective bargaining, and limit practices that harmed the general
welfare of workers, businesses, and the U.S. economy as a
whole. 161 The act defines employer according to the plain
meaning of the word, including individuals acting as agents of the
employer (directly or indirectly), with some exceptions. 162 The
term employee includes any employee and is not limited to the
employees of a particular employer, but is subject to some
exceptions. 163 For the purposes of the NLRA, a person is one or
more individuals, labor organizations, corporations, associations,
trustees, trustees in cases under title 11, or receivers. 164
Since the NLRA’s inception, courts determined that the
applicability of the NLRA is to be broadly interpreted, based on
the economic facts of the situation, instead of relying solely on
previously established legal classifications. 165 When determining
employee status, a reviewer must determine both the technical
and traditional concepts of employee and employer, as well as the
160. See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.
(2012).
161. National Labor Relations Act, NLRB (last accessed Sept. 14, 2016),
http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-relations-act.
162. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012). The Act does not categorize U.S. Government
corporations, the Federal Reserve Bank, states and their divisions, any labor
organizations (except when the organization is acting as an employer), anyone
acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such a labor organization, and any
individual subject to the Railway Labor Act as employers. Id.
163. Id. § 152(3). Such exceptions include, inter alia, agricultural laborers,
any individual employed by their parent or spouse, any independent contractor,
or any individual subject to the Railway Labor Act.
164. Id. § 152(1).
165. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944) (noting the
language of the act leaves “no doubt that its applicability is to be determined
broadly”); see also W.W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1949)
(“[W]e think in view of the general purpose and policy of the Act that Congress
did not intend to restrict the duty to bargain collectively only to those subjects
which up to 1935 had been commonly bargained about in negotiations between
employers and employees.”).
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economic realities of the situation. 166 Determining employee
status is thus a fact-bound determination applying the common
law principles of agency. 167 The key question in this agency
analysis is the alleged employer’s ability to control the purported
employee, as evidenced by the employer’s control over the manner
and means by which the work is performed. 168
3. Are League of Legends Professional Players Employees Under
the NLRA?
Determining control over a purported employer requires an
examination of many characteristics of the working
relationship. 169 Such characteristics may include: how payment
for services is determined, whether the employer provides
benefits, who provides the tools and materials to perform the
work, who designates where the work is done, the permanency of
the relationship, and chiefly whether the employer controls the
manner and means by which the work is performed. 170 Though
evidence of economic control is not per se proof of the control

166. See NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1947) (noting
that the technical and traditional concepts of employer and employee, as well as
the economic reality of the situation, must be taken into account).
167. NLRB v. O’Hare-Midway Limousine Serv., Inc., 924 F.2d 692, 694 (7th
Cir. 1991) (citing NLRB v. U.S. Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968)).
168. See id. (noting that the “inquiry centers on the employer’s ability to
control” the alleged employee, which is determined based on a number of
factors) (citations omitted); Local 777 Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB,
603 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Control exercised over the ‘manner and
means of performance’, not merely the economic controls which many
corporations are able to exercise over independent contractors with whom they
contract, is the identifying characteristic of an employer/employee
relationship.”(internal citations omitted)).
169. See O’Hare-Midway Limousine Serv., Inc., 924 F.2d at 695 (“the word,
‘control’ suggests the need for an examination of the many characteristics of an
employer-worker. . . .”).
170. Id.
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necessary to show an employee-employer relationship, 171 the
economic realities of the parties must not be overlooked. 172
The federal law employee/independent contractor analysis for
professional League of Legends players thus centers on whether
the LCS exercises sufficient control over them. 173 The LCS does
not provide benefits for players beyond the mandatory salary it
allots at the beginning of each split. 174 Though a relationship
with the LCS may be permanent (and in fact is required to
continue if the team maintains a level of play above competitors),
the relationship can end if a team fails to maintain a high level of
play. 175
Further, control over manner and means of performance is
also a difficult matter to determine. 176 The LCS exercises a wide
berth of discretion in penalizing activity that it feels is
offensive, 177 as well as penalizing “unfair” behavior. 178 In this
way, the LCS is able to oversee and control the manner and
means of performance by imposing multiple limits on what can
and cannot be done. However, it does not directly exercise control
over individual practicing habits, team strategies, etc.
The other methods of control the LCS exerts on players are
requiring the use of the League of Legends client and choosing
171. See Brown v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1972) (citing Carnation
Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1130, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 1970)) (Economic control is “not
necessarily proof of the kind of control that is relevant to a decision [of] whether
a person is a contractor or employee.” (internal citations omitted)).
172. NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1947).
173. See NLRB v. O’Hare-Midway Limousine Serv., Inc., 924 F.2d 692, 694
(7th Cir. 1991) (noting the employer/employee relationship centers on the
employer’s ability to control the alleged employee); Local 777 Democratic Union
Org. Comm., 603 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting the employer/employee
relationship is chiefly a matter of control).
174. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 2.2 (stating that starting
players must receive a minimum of $12,500 for each split).
175. See LCS Challenger series, supra note 31 (noting that the last team in
the LCS bracket is relegated to the challenger series).
176. O’Hare Midway Limousine Serv., Inc., 924 F.2d at 694.
177. See End User License Agreement League of Legends, supra note 42
(noting that Riot Games has sole, exclusive, and essentially unlimited discretion
to determining offensive conduct).
178. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, §§ 10.4, 10.5 (stating that
the LCS has sole and absolute discretion to penalize what it considers to be
“unfair play,” and that the LCS may, without limitation, issue a wide variety of
penalties).
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the venue where LCS events will be held. 179 The LCS and Riot
also sanction third party games conferences outside of the LCS
season. 180 It is hard to adequately translate the requirement of
using the League of Legends client into the typical corporate or
sports control structure. 181 The closest analogue to the League of
Legends client use requirement is mandatory software suites
used in large corporations. 182 The only difference between these
two requirements is that League of Legends players must access
the game client to practice, whether at an event or not (whereas
an employee could write a proposal or other work on a word
processor and then transfer it to the company’s computers at a
later date). 183 Thus almost all outside work for League of Legends
is bound to the game client. While this seems to be an even
higher level of control over the means of work than of a normal
professional, the oversight exercised by the LCS and Riot in these
settings is typically scant (Riot normally only responds to game
play violations if a player is reported under their reporting
system). 184 Still, such control seems akin to the type exerted by
employers over employees.
179. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, at § 8 (requiring players to
attend LCS events at the time and location determined by LCS officials); Id.
§§ 10.2.7, 10.2.8 (noting that the LCS or Riot may punish players who do not
follow the League of Legends Terms of Service or End User License Agreement,
which both prohibit use of the client outside by providers not approved by Riot).
180. See Intel Extreme Masters—Legacy, INTEL EXTREME MASTERS
http://en.intelextrememasters.com/legacy/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2016) (providing
basic information on the current and previous Intel Extreme Masters (IEM)
seasons) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice). Riot authorized League of Legends to enter the IEM in Season 6
(replacing Defense of the Ancients). Id.
181. See supra Part III.B.3.b.i.
182. See Software Use Policy, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/enus/sam/softuse.aspx (last visited Sept. 15, 2016) (providing example company
use policies, which inform employees of a corporation that they may not use
software outside of the license agreement entered into by their company) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
183. See End User License Agreement League of Legends, supra note 42
(providing a limited license to users, who in turn may not offer the game client,
in any other form, to other potential users). If users may not access the client
legally through any party other than Riot, then a team would be unable to
practice the game unless they used the official League of Legends client. Id.
184. See Riot Games Support, Reporting a Player, Comment to Picture of a
Horse, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS (May 01, 2015), https://support.riotgames.com/hc/enus/articles/201752884-Reporting-a-Player (outlining the reporting process for
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The last issue to consider is that of economic control and
economic reality. 185 Courts have noted multiple, additional
factors that help color this analysis: the degree of control by the
alleged employer, the extent of the relative investments of the
worker and alleged employer, the degree to which the worker’s
opportunity for profit and loss is determined by the alleged
employer, and the skill required in performing the job. 186 Some
considerations, such as degree of control, overlap with earlier
analysis.
The murkiest of these additional factors is the degree to
which the worker’s opportunity for profit and loss is
determined. 187 Many professional League of Legends players
receive money from other activities. 188 For some players who
stream while playing, the $25,000 per year provided by the LCS
is a small fraction of their total income. 189 For each of these high
profile streamers, there are also LCS personalities that do not
stream (or are simply unsuccessful at it). 190 For these players, the
typical League of Legends play) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice). Note that just because Riot has taken a more
relaxed approach to monitoring its players, it maintains the potential right to
monitor more intensely. See End User License Agreement League of Legends,
supra note 42.
185. See Brown v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1972) (citing Carnation
Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1130, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 1970)) (noting that control,
alone, is not only factor to consider); NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398,
403–04 (1947) (noting that the technical and traditional concepts of employer
and employee, as well as the economic reality of the situation, must be taken
into account).
186. See Reich v. Circle C. Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993)
(listing multipole factors used to gauge the degree of an alleged employee’s
dependency).
187. See id. (noting the degree of control over the worker’s opportunity for
profit or loss is a factor in the employment analysis).
188. See, e.g., Farrow, supra note 101 (giving viewer counts and time data on
popular League of Legends streamers, which are dominated by professional
players); Magdaleno, supra note 101 (giving example income figures for various
streamers).
189. See Chester, supra note 97 (noting that Michael Santana [Imaqtpie], a
professional League of Legends player on Team Dignitas at that time, made
$8,000 from streaming in a month). This would amount to roughly four times
the amount of income than that provided by the LCS (assuming the player
remained in the LCS for the complete, year-long season).
190. Streaming requires fairly large numbers of viewers (and then a large
number of those viewers willing to watch ads) in order to maintain steady
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money they receive from the LCS and the additional funds they
may receive from their team are their only sources of guaranteed
income. Though a team may increase its income via tournament
winnings, 191 or decrease its income by performing so poorly that it
is kicked out the LCS entirely, 192 these are extreme
circumstances, and are only achieved through teamwork (or the
lack thereof). Thus an individual employee’s actual ability to
manipulate their overall profits or loss is fairly contained and
dependent on the LCS.
The next factor to consider is the monetary investment of
employees. 193 The monetary investment to become a League of
Legends player is typically low. 194 Beyond a computer setup and
Internet connection, nothing else is required to play the game.
Even using top-end materials, a gaming setup typically costs less
than $2,000. 195 The true investment required to become a
professional League of Legends player is the time required to
income. See How Much Do Pro Gamers Make Streaming, PROGAMERHUB (Aug.
28, 2014), http://progamerhub.com/streaming-money/ (giving a brief break down
of the Twitch.tv streaming payment system) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
191. See Riot League Championship Series/North America/2014
http://lol.gamepedia.com/Riot_
Season/Spring
playoffs,
LEAGUEPEDIA,
League_Championship_Series/North_America/2014_Season/Spring_Playoffs
(last modified Sept. 21, 2015) (showing the distribution of the $100,000 in prizes
in the Spring Playoffs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice); Riot League Championship Series/North
America/2014/Summer
Playoffs,
LEAGUEPEDIA,
http://lol.gamepedia.com/Riot_League_Championship_Series/North_America/20
14_Season/Summer_Playoffs (last modified Sept. 21, 2015) (showing the
distribution of the $100,000 in prizes in the Summer Playoffs) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
192. See LCS Challenger Series, supra note 31 (explaining the process for
removing the last placing team from the LCS).
193. See Reich v. Circle C. Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993)
(citing Donovan v. Tehco, 642 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1981)) (explaining that the
investments of both employers and employees must be considered when
addressing the issue of economic reality).
194. See, e.g., Welcome to League of Legends, League of Legends
http://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/site/guide/index.html (noting that the game is
free to play and download) (last visited Sept. 15, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
http://www.alienware.com/Landings
195. E.g.,
Desktops,
ALIENWARE,
/desktops.aspx (last visited Sept. 15, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). The most expensive level of
Alienware gaming desktops start at $1,699.99 per unit. Id.
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become proficient at the game. 196 Professional teams typically
engage in extensive practice, consisting of both team and
individual practice times. 197 Without such intensive practice
schedules, teams are unable to compete at levels necessary to
remain competitive (especially considering that multitudes of
challenger-tier teams are frothing at the bit to enter the LCS). 198
This is a sizable investment in man-hours, but unlike typical
independent contractor investment, the time spent practicing
League of Legends is applicable almost exclusively to League of
Legends. This is not an investment by individuals that are in
business for themselves, but rather individuals dependent on
receiving funding and employment from the LCS.
Weighing the factors of control and the economic realities of
professional League of Legends players, 199 the scales tip toward
classifying pro players as employees. Professional players are
reliant upon the LCS for guaranteed income (and for some
players, the majority of their income). 200 The LCS exerts
significant control over player conduct, with the ability to fine,
suspend, or ban players. 201 Finally, the economic realities of the
relationship between the LCS and professional players suggests
that, despite substantial player investment, players are
dependent on the LCS for funding and employment.

196. See Thang, supra note 39 (quoting Team Curse’s jungler, Saintvicious,
who relayed that on average Team Curse practices twelve to fourteen hours per
day, six days a week, mixed between five to eight hours of team scrims and
three to five hours of streaming or self-practice).
197. Thang, supra note 39.
198. See LCS Challenger Series, supra note 31 (noting that the series
contains the top teams from the challenger bracket, which includes a large
number of semi-professional teams aiming for a spot in the LCS).
199. See NLRB v. O’Hare-Midway Limousine Serv., Inc., 924 F.2d 692, 694–
95 (7th Cir. 1991) (listing the control factors); Brown v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 699,
703 (9th Cir. 1972) (citing Carnation Co. v. NLRB 429 F.2d 1130, 1134–35 (9th
Cir. 1970)) (listing the economic realities factors); NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co.
331 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1947) (explaining the issue of economic reality).
200. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 2.2 (providing $12,500 to
LCS players per split).
201. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 10 (granting sole
discretion to the LCS and Riot Games to determine what is or is not offensive
conduct, and how to appropriately respond to such conduct).
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4. The FLSA Definitions of Employee

The Fair Labor Standards Act, another federal employment
regime, mostly concerns itself with employee standards of
living. 202 The FLSA, like the NLRA, defines an employee as any
individual employed by an employer, subject to certain
exceptions. 203 Additionally, the FLSA adds that “employ” means
to suffer or permit work. 204 This additional consideration seems
to suggest a slightly broader interpretation of employee under the
FLSA, compared to the NLRA.
Accordingly, the test for employment under the FLSA is the
economic reality test. 205 The crux of this test is whether, as a
matter of economic reality, the alleged employee is in business for
herself. 206 An individual who is economically dependent upon the
business to which she renders her services is thus an employee
under this test. 207
When seeking to determine the economic reality of the
nature of the working relationship, courts look at all the
circumstances of the work activity. 208 Courts have considered
multiple criteria when considering such circumstances: the
nature and degree of the alleged employer’s control over the
manner and means of the work, the employee’s opportunity for
profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill, the employee’s
investment in equipment or materials for the task or his
employment of workers, whether the services rendered require a
special skill, the degree and permanency and duration of the
202. 29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (2012).
203. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1–5) (2012) (noting that individuals employed by
the United States Government, some State Government employees, and
Agricultural employees, inter alia, are not included under the FLSA).
204. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2012).
205. See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961).
206. See Reich v. Circle C. Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993)
(citing Donovan v. Tehco, 642 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1981)).
207. See id. (noting that the issue of economic reality turns on whether the
alleged employee is economically dependent upon the business to which she
renders her services).
208. See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (citing Rutherford
Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)) (noting courts consider all the
circumstances of the work activity when determining the economic reality of the
nature of the working relationship).
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relationship, and the extent to which the service rendered is an
integral part of the alleged employer’s business. 209
The FLSA analysis overlaps much of the agency and control
analyses listed above. 210 Under the LCS rules and the League of
Legends EULA, the LCS has a great deal of control over
professional players. 211 Though streaming provides opportunities
for additional income, non-streaming player income is not greatly
affected by individual managerial skill. 212 Professional League of
Legends players do not employ workers to play for them. The
relationship between the LCS and a player is fairly stable and
permanent. 213 League of Legends play requires extensive skill,
which is specialized toward playing League of Legends and is not
easily transferrable. 214 Finally, professional players are key parts
of the LCS and its mission to advertise and create a broader
League of Legends community. 215 These factors all suggest that
professional league of legends players are employees of the LCS
under the FLSA.

209. See id. (citing Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (listing
six factors that assist in the economic reality determination); McComb, 331 U.S.
at 730 (1947)); see also Reich, 998 F.2d at 327 (5th Cir. 1993) (outlining similar
factors while providing the caveat that the factors are “merely aids in
determining the underlying question of dependency” and that no lone factor is
determinative).
210. Supra Part III.C.3.
211. See supra Part III.B.3.b (addressing the various methods of control that
the LCS exerts over players).
212. See supra Part III.C.3 (explaining that beyond tournament winnings
and being kicked out of the league, which are both highly team based, player
potential to suffer losses or profits is constrained).
213. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 4 (outlining prohibitions
on player mobility decisions without LCS approval); LCS Challenger Series,
supra note 31 (noting that the last and penultimate teams in the LCS bracket
are demoted to the challenger series).
214. See supra Part III.B.3.b. (explaining that League of Legends
professional play requires an exceptionally high degree of skill, yet this skill
does not easily transfer to other eSports).
215. See Segal, supra note 15 (explaining that Riot Games uses the LCS as
an advertising tool).
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IV. Analysis: Employment Benefits and What Rights Professional
Players Currently Lack
A. What Employment Status Brings a Professional League of
Legends Player
Even assuming that League of Legends players are
employees, why should they seek employee benefits? Employment
laws in this country were enacted largely for two purposes: to
protect employees and to ensure commercial success by curtailing
practices noted to cause industrial strife and unrest. 216 Multiple
regimes cover different employee rights. 217 The NLRA is mostly
concerned with collective bargaining. 218 The FLSA concerns itself
with providing a minimum standard of living for employees,
without substantially curtailing employment or earning power. 219
Both regimes constrict employer rights so as to ensure employee
protections. 220
For professional League of Legends players, the regime with
the greatest potential effect is the NLRA. The FLSA, which
covers employee benefits, overtime, minimum wage, and other
factors of employment, 221 is largely satisfied by the current
League of Legends contractual framework. For example, the
current yearly payment for a professional League of Legends
216. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (declaring the broad purposes behind the
passing the NLRA as protecting workers so as to remove causes of industrial
strife, which impair efficiency of commerce and diminution of employment and
wages); 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (noting that the maintenance of a minimum
standard of living necessary for the health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers helps ensure the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce).
217. Supra Part III.C.
218. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
219. 29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (2012).
220. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (declaring the broad purposes
behind passing the NLRA, including protecting employer rights by prohibiting
some employer action); 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (declaring the policy of the FLSA
as ensuring workers gain certain benefits so as to ensure a healthy workforce,
which necessarily results in curtailing some employer power).
221. See Handy Reference Guide to the Fair Labor Standards Act, DEPT. OF
LABOR WAGE AND HOUR DIV. (Nov. 2014),
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/
compliance/wh1282.pdf (providing a very basic overview of some of the
protections provided by FLSA and related laws).
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player amounts to roughly $12.02 per hour in wages, which is
well above federal and state minimum wages. 222 The collective
bargaining provisions of the NLRA, in contrast, are not satisfied
in any form by any of the player relationships. 223
B. What Can Collective Bargaining Address and to What
Categories of Employer Does It Apply?
The crux of the NLRA is Section 7, which covers the rights of
employees as to organization and collective bargaining. 224 In
particular, Section 7 provides that “[e]mployees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid.” 225
Interfering with this right constitutes an unfair labor practice by
an employer. 226
Collective bargaining does not, however, apply to all
potential matters of employment. 227 Cases are in accord, however,
222. See Season Six Official Rules, supra 24, § 2.2 (requiring a payment of
$12,500 per player for each split, amounting to $25,000 per year for a player
engaged in both events); Minimum Wage, DEPT. OF INDUST. RELATIONS DIV. OF
LABOR STANDARDS. ENF’T, http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_minimumwage.htm/
(last visited Sept. 15, 2016) (noting that the minimum wage in California, as of
January 1, 2016, is $10.00 per hour); Handy Reference Guide to the Fair Labor
OF
LABOR
WAGE
AND
HOUR
DIV.,
Standards
Act,
DEPT.
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/wh1282.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2016)
(noting that, as of July 24, 2009, the federal minimum wage is $7.25). Dividing
$25,000 by 2080 (40 hour typical work weeks multiplied by 52 weeks per year)
yields $12.01923 per hour. This number is not precisely accurate, as a team
could play any number of hours per year. But even comparing this to the yearly
minimum wage value in California shows that the LCS provides more payment
by a fairly wide margin.
223. See Richard Lewis, How Fair is an LCS Contract? We Asked a Lawyer,
THE DAILY DOT, http://www.dailydot.com/esports/lcs-contract-analysis-league-oflegends-riot-games/ (last updated Dec. 11, 2014) (noting that no labor law
provisions are addressed or apparently considered in contracts signed between
teams and players).
224. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
225. Id.
226. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).
227. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012) (providing that unfair labor practices only
occur when a certain subset of terms are not subject to collective bargaining).
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that the NLRA allows collective bargaining on matters relating to
the rates of “pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment.” 228 Further, Courts have rejected the notion that
the NLRA only covers subjects commonly bargained about at the
time of the NLRA’s inception. 229 Mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining thus extend to issues that settle an aspect of the
relationship between the employer and employees. 230
Though collective bargaining may apply to a wide variety of
issues, the National Labor Review Board (NLRB) does not have
jurisdiction over all categories of employers. 231 The NLRA
specifically allows the NLRB in its discretion, by rule of decision
or published rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act, to “decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor
dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in
228. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012); see generally J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
332 (1944); see also Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939)
(noting that the NLRA provides the subject matter of collective bargaining to be
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of employment);
Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 115 F.2d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 1940) (noting the obligation
to bargain in good faith both collectively and exclusively with a representative of
the majority of an employer’s employees on the matters of wages, hours or
employment, and working conditions); NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187, 189
(7th Cir. 1941) (noting that collective bargaining is a procedure employees may
use to address wages, hours, and other conditions of employment); NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (noting that the
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining are those outlined section [158(d)] of
the NLRA).
229. See W.W. Cross & Co.. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1949)
(“[W]e think in view of the general purpose and policy of the Act that Congress
did not intend to restrict the duty to bargain collectively only to those subjects
which up to 1935 had been commonly bargained about in negotiations between
employers and employees.”); see also NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962)
(noting that changes in sick-leave policies were “conditions of employment”
under the NLRA); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB,, 170 F.2d 247, 251 (1948)
(explaining that matters of concern arising from the employer-employee
relationship may be recognized as included under the Act, despite not being
specifically referred to); Conn. Light & Power, Co. v. NLRB,, 476 F.2d 1079,
1081 (1973) (“It is well established that included in the language are such “nonwage” benefits as the group health insurance here involved.”).
230. See Pall Corp. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 116, 119–20 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting
Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971)) (“only issues that settle an aspect of the relationship
between the employer and employees are mandatory subjects of bargaining”)
(internal citations omitted).
231. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (2012) (giving the NLRB discretion over
jurisdiction of disputes).
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the opinion of the board, the effect of such labor dispute on
commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of
its jurisdiction.” 232 However, the NLRB cannot decline to assert
jurisdiction over any labor dispute that it would have asserted
jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1,
1959. 233
The NLRB has declined jurisdiction over activities with some
interstate ramifications, but which principally affect local
matters. 234 The NLRB also applies policy considerations when
declining jurisdiction. 235 As such, new categories of employment
may be outside NLRB jurisdiction, even if they would qualify as
employers under the Act. 236
For the purposes of eSports, sound policy reasons discourage
the NLRB from declining to extend jurisdiction. 237 League of
Legends, alone, has wide reaching economic effects, the majority
of which are not limited to any state. 238 Beyond economic effects,
the NLRB has exercised jurisdiction over similar actions (i.e.
professional sports, which the LCS mimics). 239 Given the past
actions of the NLRB and the policies of the NLRA, if professional
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., Centennial Turf Club, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 97 at 698 (1971)
(declining to extend NLRB jurisdiction over a horseracing track, as the effects of
the track were essentially local in character, despite affecting interstate
commerce).
235. See, e.g., Evan & Kunz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 197 at 1218 (1972)
(concluding that it “would not effectuate the policies of the act” for the NLRB to
assert jurisdiction over law firms or lawyers).
236. Id.
237. Infra Part IV. D.
238. See Tassi, supra note 6 (providing information on the millions of
players, per diem, who play League of Legends all over the globe); PC Gaming
Leading the Way with eSports and Video Streaming, ETEKNIX (2013),
http://www.eteknix.com/pc-gaming-is-leading-the-way-with-esports-videostreaming/ (noting eSports has become a multi-billion dollar global industry) (on
file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); The
Worldwide eSports Market Reaches 134 Million Viewers, SUPERDATA, (May 4,
2015), http://www.superdataresearch.com/blog/esports-brief/ (providing data on
the millions of individuals, from across the globe, who watch League of Legends)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
239. See cases cited supra note 154 (listing NLRB decisions asserting
jurisdiction over various professional sports); see also Jon Robinson, supra note
9 (noting the LCS mimics traditional sports).
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League of Legends players are considered employees, the NLRB
will likely have to assert jurisdiction. 240
C. Who Would Bargain?
If League of Legends players are employees, what form
would their bargaining take? Though a group can collectively
bargain, employers are only required to bargain with
representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining “by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes.” 241 The division of the unit is
determined by the NLRB, subject to certain specific
considerations. 242 The NLRB is not required to select the most
appropriate bargaining unit, rather it must only choose a unit
within the range of appropriate units under the circumstances. 243
The
critical
consideration
for
determining
the
appropriateness of a bargaining unit is whether the employees
within the unit share a “community of interest.” 244 In
determining this community of interest, the NLRB is free to
consider a wide variety of non-exclusive factors. 245 Such factors
include the wishes of employees, the similarity of the working
duties and conditions, the character of various workplaces, and
240. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 154 (listing NLRB decisions asserting
jurisdiction over various professional sports).
241. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012).
242. Id. at § 159(b).
243. See NLRB v. J.C. Penney Co., Store No. 29-9, 620 F.2d 718, 719 (9th
Cir. 1980) (internal citation omitted) (noting the NLRB is only required to
choose an appropriate unit, not the most appropriate unit); N.L.R.B. v. Bogart
Sportswear Mfg. Co., 485 F.2d 1203, 1206 (5th Cir. 1973) (internal citations
omitted) (same); see also N.L.R.B. v. Mercy Hosps. of Sacremento, Inc., 589 F.2d
968, 972 (9th Cir. 1978) (internal citations omitted) (explaining that it is wellsettled that the NLRB has a large measure of discretion in determining
appropriate bargaining units).
244. See J.C. Penney Co., Store No. 29-9, 620 F.2d at 719 (citing Allied
Chem, & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 172–73
(1971)).
245. See Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1195, 1200 (3rd Cir.
1974) (citing Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 156 (1941))
(“[T]he board is free to consider a wide variety of factors, and the presence of
absence of one or even several of them is not necessarily determinative of the
case.”).
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the anticipated effectiveness of the bargaining unit in
maintaining industrial peace. 246
Professional League of Legends Players, as a bargaining
unit, would likely only consist of players, with no additional
protections granted to LCS employees or other Riot employees.
There are two interrelated reasons for this to occur. First, it is not
in the best interest for LCS employees to include other employee
types within any potential players union. 247 The economic
considerations of players, compared to other LCS employees, are
very different. 248
The second reason builds off the first. Though the NLRB
determines the bargaining unit, it may not determine a unit that
includes both professional and non-professional employees unless
a majority of the professional employees therein vote to include
the non-professionals. 249 Professional employees include any
employee engaged in work that is: predominantly intellectual and
varied; involves consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in
its performance; of such a character that the output produced
cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time; or
requires knowledge in an advanced intellectual field or specific
instruction from an institution of higher learning. 250 Professional
League of Legends players engage in sophisticated play against
other players, using their own discretion during games. 251 The
results of such games are almost impossible to predict with great
accuracy, and the situation of each game can vary wildly. 252 This
246. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 313 U.S. at 156 (1941).
247. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012). Given that bargaining units
discuss rates of wages, hours of employment, etc., it seems easier for players to
more adequately represent their own interests and time schedules by including
only players. Especially when one considers that eSports players are subject to
many more agreements (such as the LCS Official Rules) than a normal LCS
employee.
248. See, e.g., ESports Associate Manager, Riot Games (last visited Sept. 15,
2016), http://www.riotgames.com/careers/120787 (providing an outline of duties
for an eSports LCS associate manager, whose duties are very administrative
and vastly different from a professional player).
249. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2012) (providing professionals the opportunity
to vote on whether non-professionals should be included in bargaining unit).
250. Id. § 152(12)(a) (2012) (defining professional employees).
251. See supra Part III.B.3.b.
252. See, e.g., Thang, supra note 39 (specifically noting a comeback play by
team curse to win the game, despite the enemy team attacking their final
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suggests that professional League of Legends players are
professional employees under the NLRA. 253 Given that League of
Legends players are subject to unique stresses (such as playing
the game or conforming to the additional LCS rules) they would
likely fail to agree to any potential bargaining unit that included
nonprofessionals (such as the majority of LCS staff).
D. Why Bargain?
Even if professional League of Legends players are entitled
to bargain, there is no guarantee that the players would enter
into a bargaining unit. As of the writing of this note, there is not
a great divide between LCS policy and player action. 254 Much of
the typical bargaining subjects, such as wages, appear to be
satisfactorily handled so far. 255 So why would players even
consider bargaining?
Despite the apparent harmony between the LCS and pro
players, there are two areas where players maintain little to no
rights. 256 These areas, player mobility and administrative
actions, may have dire effects on players. 257 In particular,
administrative actions by the LCS can potentially destroy a
player’s entire career, with no options for a player to contest such
rulings within the LCS. 258

structure).
253. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(12)(a) (2012) (defining professional employees).
254. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, at 5 (outlining the policy
and purpose of the rules, which aim to ensure a healthy professional eSports
scene).
255. See supra Part IV.B. (noting that wages, a typically contentious
bargaining issue, appear satisfactorily handled under the current LCS
framework).
256. Infra Part IV.D.1–2.
257. See, e.g., Parkin, supra note 96 (suspending professional players from
playing League of Legends, which in turn prevents them from working as
professional players during that period).
258. See generally Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 11.1 (noting all
decisions regarding the interpretation of the LCS rules, as well as penalties
given for misconduct, are final and cannot be appealed).
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1. Player Mobility

The LCS governs certain aspects of player mobility under
sections three and four of the LCS Regular Season Rules. 259 The
LCS rules cannot be violated by any contracts among players and
teams regarding these aspects of mobility, though additional
terms beyond the LCS rules may be imposed. 260 Even
discretionary team actions, such as promoting or demoting
players, require LCS approval, are governed by specific rules, and
require specific forms. 261
This extra level of control by the LCS limits bargaining
power of players. When bargaining with their team, the
player/team agreement may dictate terms such as “no
assignment” or “no trading” deals. 262 However, beyond these
terms, the basic mobility rules are limited to LCS control. 263
Though players and teams may create various terms in their
contracts, the LCS rules act as a behemoth above them. 264 Not
only are these LCS rules controlling over agreements that conflict
with them, but their scope and nature may be changed by the
LCS in its discretion. 265

259. See generally Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, §§ 3–4 (outlining
the requirements and limits on player mobility imposed by the LCS).
260. See id. § 4.1.2 (forbidding team/player agreements from contractually
violating any clauses on player substitution as outlined in the LCS rules); id.
§ 4.3.2 (establishing the mandatory schedule for free agent signing during the
regular seasons); id. § 4.3.4 (requiring free agent signing requests to be
submitted to and approved by the LCS before becoming effective); id. § 4.3.4.1–5
(providing the mandatory information that must be provided to the LCS).
261. See id. § 4.4.3 (regarding LCS approval); Id. §§ 4.4.3.1–3 (outlining the
process and rules for receiving approval); Id. §§ 4.4.5.1–4.4.5.2.2 (listing the
required forms necessary).
262. Id. § 4.2.7
263. See id. § 11.1 (noting that interpretation of player eligibility and
mobility lies with the LCS).
264. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, at 5 (stating that the rules
apply to all players who wish to participate in the LCS, and are not negotiated
upon); Id. § 10.5 (stating that not obeying the rules results in penalties which
include being unable to participate in the LCS).
265. See id. § 11.2 (“These Rules may be amended, modified, or
supplemented by LCS, from time to time, in order to ensure fair play and the
integrity of LCS.”).
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Due to their mutable yet inscrutable form, the LCS rules
effectively eliminate many types of player security. 266 Even if
players formed a bargaining unit solely to deal with their
individual team, the LCS rules effectively undo any such
agreements between teams and their players. 267 Thus without the
ability to effectively engage with the LCS and assert control over
its rule creation process, player influence is eviscerated.
2. Administrative Action
What makes the LCS rules most oppressive is the complete
discretion and control granted to LCS administrative decisions. 268
In the aptly named “Spirt of the Rules” section within the LCS
ruleset, all decisions regarding the interpretation of the rules are
bequeathed solely to the LCS. 269 The LCS warns that all
decisions with respect to the LCS rules “cannot be appealed and
shall not give rise to any claim for monetary damages or other
legal or equitable remedy.” 270
The only ability to overturn such LCS rulings is via a review
process, which is solely under the discretion of the LCS. 271 There
are no hard guidelines for the review, but the LCS provides
“general principles” that it claims to apply in its review. 272 These
principles are wide-reaching, but are typically based on the
frequency and magnitude of a player’s “toxic behavior.” 273 The
266. Id. By providing the LCS the ability to amend rules at its whim,
players have little ability to guarantee that certain rights currently provided by
the LCS will remain in effect.
267. E.g., Nick Allen, NA LCS Competitive Ruling—Andy “Reginald” Dinh,
supra note 74 (fining the Team Solo Mid manager $ 2,000 for failing to wait for
LCS approval in announcing a contract between Team Solo Mid and the Korean
player “Lustboy.”).
268. Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 11.
269. Id. § 11.1.
270. Id.
271. See Nick Allen, Competitive Policy Revision: Permabanned Players,
LEAGUE OF LEGENDS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://2015.na.lolesports.com/articles/
competitive-policy-revision-permabanned-players (noting that those players
eligible for review shall be reviewed by the LCS Operations Team) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
272. Id.
273. Id.
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LCS also claims to conduct thorough investigations and reviews,
though the exact nature of the review is not posted, nor is its
validity challengeable by a player. 274 For players who rely on
their ability to play in order to receive income, such rulings can
have dramatic effects. 275
The LCS review process is atypical compared to other
professional sports. In the NBA, for example, misconduct by
players or teams is handled pursuant to Article 35 of the NBA
Constitution, with decisions appealable to either the Board of
Governors or an arbitrator. 276 The arbitration procedure is
described within the National Basketball Players Association’s
(NBPA) Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). 277 The
procedure outlined in the CBA provides methods for initiating
grievances, 278 rules for pre-hearing motions, 279 rules for
hearings, 280 the procedure governing appeals and appointing an
administrator, 281 the ability of an arbitrator to offer awards, 282
274. See, e.g., Nick Allen, End-Of-Suspension Review: Erlend “NukeDuck”
Holm, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS (Dec. 9, 2014), http://2015.na.lolesports.com/
articles/end-suspension-review-erlend-%E2%80%9Cnukeduck%E2%80%9Dholm
(lifting the suspension of Erlend Holm after he showed “drastic improvement” to
his in game behavior) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice). The LCS does not provide additional information
after review, beyond the ruling provided above.
275. See Press Release, Ninjas in Pajamas Gaming, Erlend “NukeDuck”
Holm and Alfonso “Mithy” Rodriguez Have Been Released from Ninjas in
Pajamas (June 2, 2014) (on file with author) (noting that as a “direct result of
the recent suspension” both players received, that Ninjas in Pajamas must drop
the two from their roster, as they are unable to compete in any upcoming
events).
276. See NAT’L BASKETBALL ASSOC., CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE
NATIONAL
BASKETBALL
ASSOCIATION
Art.
35
(May
29,
2012),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/files/221035054-nba-constitution-and-by-laws.pdf
(noting that rulings on misconduct may be appealed by teams to the Board of
Governors, or by players to an arbitrator in accordance with Art. XXXI of the
National Basketball Players Association Collective Bargaining Agreement).
277. See National Basketball Association—National Basketball Players
Association Collective Bargaining Agreement [hereinafter NBA-NBPA CBA] Art.
XXXI (2011), http://nbpa.com/cba/ (providing the arbitration procedure to be
followed by the Union and the Association).
278. Id. § 2.
279. Id. § 3.
280. Id. § 4.
281. Id. §§ 5, 7.
282. Id. § 6.
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and issues regarding appeals. 283 Via these provisions,
professional basketball players within the NBA protect
themselves from the potential risk of arbitrary or unfair
decisions. 284 That is not to say that the system is one hundred
percent balanced between players and the NBA, but there are far
more protections in place than there are in the LCS system. 285
Via collective bargaining, LCS players could attempt to
create similar provisions to those found in the NBA-NBPA CBA.
For LCS players to include these administrative matters into a
potential CBA, professional players must prove that the
disciplinary action at hand threatened matters outlined in the
NLRA. 286 Factors that help color the analysis of such a
disciplinary system include whether the final arbiter is a “neutral
third party chosen freely by both sides” and whether the system
is designed “entirely by employers and owners.” 287 For the case of
the LCS, the administrative system consists of both a non-neutral
arbiter and is designed completely by the LCS. 288 As such, a
potential professional League of Legends players’ collective
bargaining unit could bargain with the LCS on these issues. 289
This is not to say that the collective bargaining done by any
potential player unit would result in draconian, untenable
provisions. On the contrary, including the players in the
bargaining process would help create a more open penalty
system, which would provide players with more security. It would
also serve to further legitimize eSports as actual sporting
events. 290
283. Id. § 9.
284. See generally NBA-NBPA CBA Art. XXXI (providing courses of actions
players can use to protect themselves against certain actions by the NBA).
285. Compare id. with Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, §§ 10-11.
286. See The Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 191
n.13 (1969) (noting that the NLRB could become involved within baseball’s
internal regulation system if the disciplinary action promoted by baseball
arbitrators threatened rights protected under 29 U.S.C. § 157).
287. Id. at 191.
288. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 11 (noting the LCS has
the discretion to modify and change the rules it has promulgated at its
discretion).
289. The Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. at 191 n.13.
290. See, e.g., Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957)
(recognizing the NFL as being subject to NLRB jurisdiction); Haywood v. Nat’l
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E. The Potential Dark Side of Bargaining
Even if professional League of Legends players are deemed
employees by the NLRB, and a collective bargaining unit is
created, there is no guarantee that such an action might not end
up causing more hardship for players. Specifically, without
careful consideration of how to use the bargaining unit,
professional players might destroy their very profession.
The LCS, itself, is a money loser, according to Riot Games
staff. 291 By subjecting the LCS to the costs of lawyers, the time
costs of actual dispute resolution, and the potential costs of
having to provide additional benefits to players (while suffering
the threat of strikes or walk-outs), the LCS may reach a level of
unprofitability that is untenable. 292 In response the LCS may
restructure its rules to remove player compensation in an
attempt to destroy any potential employee relationship, or the
LCS might simply disband. 293 In either case, players take a huge
hit: either they lose their compensation or they lose their venue to
play.
Such naysaying is likely misplaced. The main issues affecting
players under a potential CBA would likely be player mobility
and penalty administration, as salary and benefits appear
adequately covered in other areas of the relationship and rules. 294
As such, the CBA may not be particularly onerous. 295 Further,
the LCS can arrange for “No Strike” or “No Lockout” provisions,
in order to maintain stable relations, even in times of player-LCS

Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (recognizing basketball as being subject
to NLRB jurisdiction). Professional sports are typically subject to NLRB
jurisdiction.
291. See Segal, supra note 15 (noting that Mark Merrill, the Riot Games
CEO, admitted the LCS is a money loser).
292. See id. (noting that the LCS provides revenue from advertising that
apparently offsets its cost).
293. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, § 11.2 (allowing the LCS
to amend, modify, or supplement the rules).
294. See supra Part IV.B. (explaining that players seem to enjoy adequate
wages from the LCS).
295. See id. (noting that, because monetary compensation seems well
established, the LCS can largely avoid a large amount of monetary cost due to
bargaining).

406

22 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 359 (2016)

disagreement. 296 Using such provisions, the LCS may perhaps
create more stability for the future, by assuring that any
grievances that could arise would be handled in predictable
ways. 297 Further, the reputation of the LCS and League of
Legends as a professional sport would be greatly enhanced by
player collective bargaining, as it provides further evidence that
League of Legends players are legitimate sports professionals. 298
This legitimacy may provide greater viewer attraction to the LCS
and attract more players to League of Legends. 299
Another problem facing a potential player collective
bargaining unit is the issue of minority representation. The
NLRA makes it the duty of the employer to bargain collectively
with the chosen representatives of her employees, and exacts a
negative duty to treat with no others. 300 With the wide variety of
professional League of Legends players, and their distinct
backgrounds, it may be difficult to adopt a representative that
does not isolate a large minority of players. 301 Though the NLRA
296. See, e.g., NBA-NBPA CBA Art. XXX §§ 1–2 (2011) (containing such a
provision). These provisions minimize potential disruption to play schedules.
297. See id. (by preventing strikes and lockouts, the NBA-NBPA CBA
prevents disruptions from those activities).
298. See, e.g., Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (noting
football, a professional sport, is subject to collective bargaining); Haywood v.
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (noting basketball, a professional
sport, is subject to collective bargaining).
299. See Robinson, supra note 9 (noting the aspects of eSports that are akin
to real sports). As making the LCS more sports-like seems to be an effective
marketing strategy, furthering its legitimacy may increase this effectiveness.
300. See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683–84 (1944)
(citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44 (1937)) (noting the
act exacts a negative duty to bargain only with the chosen representatives of the
unit employees); see also Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 384 F.2d
38, 45 (5th Cir. 1957) (noting that the duty to deal only with the bargaining unit
representative chosen by the majority is strong, but “no less stringent is the
duty not to deal with one having only minority support.”); NLRB v. Appletown
Elec. Co., 296 F.2d 202, 207 (7th Cir. 1961) (internal citations omitted) (noting
that Congress gave an appropriate bargaining unit selected by a majority the
right to obtain recognition for the entire unit, including a non-consenting
minority).
301. E.g.,
Team
Solo
Mid—Player
Roster,
LEAGUEPEDIA,
http://lol.gamepedia.com/Team_SoloMid#Player_Roster (last visited Sept. 15,
2016) (providing the demographics of the Team Solo Mid player roster, which
includes three United States citizens, two Danish citizens, and one Canadian
citizen) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
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itself 302 and case law 303 seek to protect these unit minorities, such
protections are not always effective.
Again, such worries are likely unfounded for a pro League of
Legends bargaining unit. The key issues of player mobility and
administrative penalties are mostly based on a lack of options or
appeals. 304 Player interests likely intersect on these points, which
apply equally to all players in multiple circumstances. 305 The fact
that players have so many different backgrounds may actually
ensure that the bargaining unit can only succeed in these specific
areas, simply due to the lack of consensus on more personalized
issues. 306
V. Conclusion
ESports is still in its infancy, despite a long gestation
period. 307 Individuals may now support themselves solely from
playing video games. 308 For professional players of the game
League of Legends, the game mimics professional sports in both
Justice).
302. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2012) (providing minorities the right to seek
separate representation by filing a petition to the NLRB).
303. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953) (internal
citations omitted) (explaining that the statutory obligation that a bargaining
unit represent all its members requires the unit to make an honest effort to
serve all those members, without hostility to any).
304. See Season Six Official Rules, supra note 24, §§ 2.2, 4, 10 (outlining
player compensation, player mobility, and penalties, respectively).
305. See id. § 4 (noting that player mobility provisions apply to all teams,
and thus all teams’ players).
306. See Team Solo Mid—Player Roster supra note 301 (giving an example
of the vast demographics that can be found on League of Legends teams).
307. See Owen Good, Today is the 40th Anniversary of the World’s First
Known
Video
Gaming
Tournament,
KOTAKU
(Oct.
19,
2012),
http://kotaku.com/5953371/today-is-the-40th-anniversary-of-the-worlds-first-knownvideo-gaming-tournament (remembering the “Space War” tournament on
Stanford’s campus, which awarded the tournament winner a year’s subscription
to ROLLING STONE magazine) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
308. See discussion Part IV.A. (explaining that professional eSports players
receive, at minimum, a salary higher than minimum wage); see also Chester,
supra note 97 (noting that Michael Santana [Imaqtpie], a professional League of
Legends player on Team Dignitas at that time, made $8,000 from streaming in a
month).
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form and the relationship between players and the LCS. 309 The
LCS appears to exert sufficient control over pro League of
Legends players so as to qualify those players as employees of the
LCS. 310
Employee status provides players with benefits that truly
mimic those of professional athletic sports players. These benefits
include the right to collectively bargain. 311 Through collective
bargaining, League of Legends players can fight for fair
provisions under LCS agreements, and ensure that future
professional eSports players can enjoy just and healthy
employment in the field. 312
Currently, players have not attempted to form a collective
bargaining unit and the NLRB has not asserted jurisdiction over
eSports. There is no guarantee that the LCS, after learning of the
potential for a collective bargaining action, will not stop providing
payment (in an attempt to eliminate the employee relationship)
or dissolve altogether. However, by embracing the employee
status of professional employees, the LCS can further legitimize
itself as an actual sport. 313 This, in turn, would likely bring more
potential players into League of Legends (increasing the game’s
profitability) while also bringing more viewers to LCS events.
The path ahead for eSports is murky. There is little
guarantee that they will ever rise to the level of athletic sports in
terms of profitability, prestige, or function. Attempting to
frustrate player rights by consistently billing eSports
professionals as non-employees, however, will only ensure that
eSports never reach that higher goal. The LCS and professional
League of Legends players have the potential to shape the future
of eSports, in a way that has never been possible until this time.
309. See discussion supra Part II.A. (outlining the sports-like qualities of
League of Legends); see also discussion supra Part II.B. (providing basic
information on the relationship between the LCS and professional players);
discussion supra Part III (analyzing LCS relationship in depth).
310. Discussion supra Part III.
311. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
312. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012) (ensuring that issues such as
wages, hours, and other necessary terms of employment are subject to
bargaining).
313. See cases cited supra note 298 (listing the various sports over which the
NLRB has authorized collective bargaining, which League of Legends could join
if professional players were found to be employees).
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For the good of the entire eSports enterprise, both groups should
embrace the employee status of professional League of Legends
players, and work together to ensure a bright future for both
players and game makers.

